The City of Hong Kong, or the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (HKSAR for short), was established by the British Empire between 1841 and 1898, where the colony was founded upon the seizure of land from China after the Opium Wars and then the Hong Kong 99-year lease in 1898. Conveniently located on the coast of the South China Sea, the colony became a main trade port and economic artery for global commerce and trade. It often came into conflict with mainland China ever since the rise of the Communist Party in 1949, with its people concerning themselves over the erosion of their civil rights which were established by its unique connection with Britain. These values of civil rights and democracy were partially established by the British Empire by a steady increase of democratization and representation within their colonial government, but was primarily accelerated by the United Kingdom in the years before the 99-year lease ran out.
Tensions remained high long before the handover, with events such as an unsuccessful 1967 leftist insurgency by “Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-affiliated organizations in Hong Kong under the influence of the Cultural Revolution [alienating] many Hong Kong citizens….”, with their “terrorist tactics used toward the end of the uprising” (Hung 505-506) in particular forcing the leftists within the city to maintain a low profile. This lack of a strong leftist/communist political institution or party within the city gave rise to “a new wave of student and social movements” that often “criticized both authoritarian rule in China and colonial British rule in Hong Kong.” (507) It is during this time period that its modern civil structure began to form, with general anti-authoritarian sentiments dominating much of Hong Kong’s political structure as it began to receive “long-delayed democratic reforms.” (507) It is this existence of an anti-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and thriving civil society on the border of mainland China that the Communist Party feared so much at the time, and continues to fear today. After a “full-fledged conservative turn” (507) of the Chinese Communist Party after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre (democratic demonstrations in Mainland China that led to heavy crackdowns and the death of an unknown hundreds or thousands, now covered up and censored by the Communist Party), anti mainland sentiments would only continue to grow. Even today, many “Hong Kong citizens see the democrats as trusted defenders of Hong Kong’s liberty after 1997, as suggested by the stable majority vote they have obtained in nearly all direct elections.” (507)
The Hong Kong of today is one with a vocal Chinese populace strongly opposed to the systems and governance developed from the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics ideology. Political protest is a way of life for Hong Kong denizens, with events such as candle light vigils for those killed during the Tiananmen Square Massacre becoming a yearly tradition. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to logging and fighting against the authoritarianism in Communist China often have offices in Hong Kong, with higher standards of journalistic integrity and freedom of information allowing these organizations to work in a safe environment. As authors Hung Ho-fung and Ip Iam-chong put it in their 2012 publication within the Asian Survey, “…we see the persistence of civil society and general political freedom in Hong Kong, despite stagnation and setbacks… is turning Hong Kong into the only place in China where the CCP government can be criticized overtly.” (525)
From 2014 onward, however, Mainland China has been making more of a concerted effort to squash the city-sized democratic anomaly within their borders. Between the time of the Asian Survey article and the end of the 99-year lease, Beijing was largely constricted in the crackdowns they could perform within the city. To prevent opposition within Hong Kong was nothing at all like their previous ventures in Tibet and Xinjiang, as an article within the New York Times, Crossing the Red Line: Behind China’s Takeover of Hong Kong by Chris Buckley, Vivian Wang and Austin Ramzy expertly points out; Hong Kong had developed a “British-derived legal system, a popular and well-organized democratic opposition and far greater global economic exposure.” Hong Kong for a long time had acted as the economic crux of the People’s Republic of China, with Hong Kong making up a staggering 18% of China’s GDP at the time of the city’s handover. (Lee) The government feared that pushing too hard against Hong Kong could result in long-form protests and boycotts that would damage what many call Mainland China’s “…offshore financial center” (Hung 505), which at the time was being used to facilitate the growing interest in globalizing China’s currency and trade, connecting it with the rest of the global network. Previous CCP administrators attempted to pass national security legislation in 2003, for instance, but were subsequently swamped by widespread protests and forced to back down.
This attitude changed in 2014 after Beijing stated that they would wield “comprehensive jurisdiction” (Buckley) over the city, with General Secretary Xi Jinping (ascending to the position in 2012) building up to his siege on the city’s freedoms over the next few years. Examining documentation during the time of the build up shows us that the mainland government had grown tired from the constant “protests in Hong Kong”, became impatient with the city’s “pro-Beijing ruling elite” wavering in their support, while also holding “a conviction that Hong Kong had become a haven for Western-backed subversion.” (Buckley) The city could no longer strongarm mainland China into fearing a disastrous dip in their economy with an unstable Hong Kong. While the city had dropped to 3% of Hong Kong’s GDP by 2014, a larger reliance on tech centers like Shenzhen and political/economic machines such as Shanghai and Guangzhou provided Xi Jinping and his government the perfect opportunity to strike. (Lee)
Years after 2014 were spent on internal and external investigations on what could be done against Hong Kong’s current social society; “Hawkish voices began advancing arguments that China could impose a security law on the city by constitutional fiat” (Buckley). Others argued that already established national security laws had the grounds to apply to Hong Kong. Ultimately, it was found that in “a dire crisis, Chinese leaders could ‘take all necessary measures’ to defend sovereignty, casting aside the fetters of lesser laws.” (Buckley)
In 2019, peaceful protests began in response to the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, more commonly known as the 2019 Hong Kong extradition bill. Before the handover in 1997, Hong Kong had passed laws that banned the extradition of prisoners to mainland China, an action stemming from a fear of Hong Kong political freedoms being bypassed by the CCP. If China could order the extradition of prisoners, the impartiality of the Hong Kong legal system could be bypassed by Beijing, allowing for the unjust imprisonment of political activists, pro-democracy politicians, controversial individuals, etc. After an infamous Taiwanese murder case in which the criminal (A Taiwanese citizen who fled to Hong Kong) could not be extradited to Taiwan as they lacked a formal extradition treaty with Taiwan, the government pushed to allow “case-by-case transfers of fugitives to any jurisdiction with which the city lacks a formal extradition treaty.”, which to many was effectively opening up the city to “the long arm of mainland Chinese law.” (Leung) This protest quickly exploded into “a massive movement, venting years of pent-up discontent over Beijing’s encroachments” (Leung), with the defacement of a national emblem with ink finally causing the Communist Party to act. The Party claimed the incident had put the central government’s authority into question, months later leading to the passing of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or better known as the Hong Kong National Security Bill in June 2020.
The content of the bill divides itself between four offenses: “separatism, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign powers” (Buckley), with punishments being up to life in prison at the judge’s discretion. The Communist Party also forced hawkish oversight on schools, colleges and pieces of media, notably causing anti-Mainland publications (such as The Apple Daily, a Hong Kong pro-democracy tabloid) to go out of business. Perhaps most notable of all is the creation of a new Chinese security agency directly in Hong Kong, which was only accountable to the Communist Party. Provided with massive leeway to “investigate cases and bring defendants to trial on the mainland” (Buckley), the agency not only makes the fears of the extradition bill a reality, but is even more powerful and blatant in execution.
What is fascinating about the passing of this bill is not the content, but also the way it was passed. Unlike beforehand where the Communist Party and their supporters publicly spoke upon different ways a national security bill could be put into effect, the buildup and passing of this bill was done particularly covertly; “Notably absent was any talk of security legislation imposed directly by Beijing… Not even mainland Chinese scholars talked about this possibility at that time.” (Buckley) The people of Hong Kong were largely kept in the dark when it came to the actual content of the bill, with it suddenly coming into force on June 30th, 2020. Within a year, the bill was used to arrest “117 people… charging more than 60, mostly democratic politicians, activists, journalists and students.” (Yiu) Over 10,000 have been charged due to their “involvement in the 2019 protests, often many months after the events in question.” (“Dismantling a Free Society.”) The bill itself has also provided a green light for the mainland to expand and further the pressures placed upon the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong administration has been steered firmly into the direction of the pro-Beijing camp; potential legislators who publicly support independence or pro-democracy movements, seek help from foreign interference, or act in opposition to the national security bill and to national security in general (a purposefully broad term) are no longer allowed to hold office. Immediately after this decision in November 2020, the Hong Kong government immediately disqualified four pro-democracy legislators. Later, fifteen other pro-democracy legislators resigned. In January 2021, 53 pro-democracy politicians were arrested after their attempts to organize a public opinion poll to aid pro-democracy candidates for the upcoming election. Continuing to step further from anything reminiscent of a fair and impartial democracy, the Hong Kong administration under Chief Executive Carrie Lam (handpicked by Beijing in 2017) has largely stayed in line with the mainland as the rights of Hong Kong citizens continue to dissipate.
The bill also goes beyond the human rights guarantees established by the Hong Kong constitution, poking holes into “Hong Kong’s legal framework via the Basic Law” (“Dismantling a Free Society”). This basic law formulated upon the protection of the freedom of expression, information, association, peaceful assembly, the sanctity of participating in public government, fair and impartial voting, etc., has effectively become nullified by the National Security Bill, with Beijing and its pro-Beijing Hong Kong legislators having broad control over the last word in these affairs. Denizens and government officials have been forced to “publicly express loyalty to the Chinese government. Teachers face pressure to self-censor and promote patriotism. Civil servants and even government contract workers are required to pledge allegiance to the ‘Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China’, which emphasizes Beijing’s authority over Hong Kong, or be fired.” (“Dismantling a Free Society”). Pro-democracy publications are now under pressure by a fake news bill to conform towards the party line. Pro-democracy businesses, previously organizing to protect and support one another under the Yellow Economy Circle moniker, have now become targets of government harassment and persecution. Some businesses have been forced to take down pro-democracy symbols within their own property, with the fear of being forced to shut down, receiving a denial towards a lease renewal, or outright being arrested pressuring them to fall into line. Public information—things such as books, websites, social media and academic journals—have been subject to heavy censorship, which has gone against the previous freedom of information that Hong Kong citizens had once experienced before the recent crackdowns.
Of course, the people of Hong Kong have not taken this encroachment lying down. Protesters have often been seen supporting businesses that have been censored or bullied by the pro-Beijing Hong Kong administration. The use of creative loopholes and workarounds to protest has also been prominent, with slogans and signs censored by the National Security Law now appearing as blank or abstract shapes in an attempt to protest censorship in general. Even as the Hong Kong administration and its Public Order Ordinance forces protesters to apply in advance with law enforcement before a peaceful protest can take place — largely contradictory to what the point of a peaceful assembly is to begin with, as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights asserts — denizens continue to organize even under the fear of persecution. These refusals to back down from peaceful protest have in turn been matched with increasing police brutality and heavy handedness by the Hong Kong administration. Although Hong Kong’s law enforcement was once considered “Asia’s Finest” for their adherence to professionalism and respect for rights, they have recently been accused of using force that was “disproportionate and excessive”, and not adhering to their own “internal guidelines” when dealing with protests. (“Dismantling a Free Society.”)
Even now, both mainland China and pro-Beijing legislators in Hong Kong advocate that these changes are for the best, even with fervent protests from across the city. People like Regina Ip, a member of the Executive Council in Hong Kong and fervent pro-Beijing legislator argue that the moves were an adequate response to the 2019 protests, which had been rocking the city with “a series of crises” that prevented Hong Kong from seeing a prompt “return to peace”. (Ip) To her, the National Security Bill was necessary to maintain order in a city slowly dipping into dangerous rhetoric and chaos, with the unrest causing the city to downgrade “to second place in its Economic Freedom Index for 2020, citing ‘ongoing political and social turmoil”; Hong Kong has ranked first since 1995.” (Ip) She further argues that as Hong Kong will always be a part of China, it will therefore always be interlinked with the will and “destiny” of the mainland. The pro-democracy movement has become unrealistic in scope in her eyes—with some calls of independence causing her to fear the future of the city in general—going against the realistic goal of Hong Kong “to [remain] the freest and most international city in China…” without angering the sleeping dragon of Beijing.
What legislators like Regina Ip fail to note is how broadly this bill has been used to begin with; it is not only pro-democracy radicals that have been affected, but average citizens and the general, social, and cultural customs of Hong Kong as a whole. The attempts of Beijing to strip Hong Kong denizens of their special privileges as of late has not been out of a desperate response to maintain the status quo, but a carefully planned siege against what makes the city of Hong Kong so economically free to begin with. As the Human Rights Watch notes, it is effectively the dismantling of a society in the image of another; it is unlikely that any society, nevermind a society that has maintained and expanded its civil structure through activism and protest for generations, would be content with such an occurrence. As a permanent headquarters for China’s security agency “about the size of two football fields” (Buckley) continues to be built on Hong Kong’s waterfront, however, it seems that the Chinese Communist Party feels confident in its eventual victory against Hong Kong’s pro-democracy forces; even if that means stripping all of Hong Kong’s autonomy, burning the entire social society that city has been built upon, and starting anew.
Works Cited
Buckley, Chris, et al. “Crossing the Red Line: Behind China’s Takeover of Hong Kong.” The New York Times, 28 June 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/china-hong-kong-security-law.html.
“Dismantling a Free Society.” Human Rights Watch, 28 June 2021, https://www.hrw.org/feature/2021/06/25/dismantling-free-society/hong-kong-one-year-after-national-security-law.
Hung Ho-fung and Ip Iam-chong. “Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement and the Making of China’s Offshore Civil Society.” Asian Survey, vol 56, no. 3, University of California Press, 2012.
Lee, Timothy. “Hong Kong used to be 18 percent of China’s GDP. Now it’s 3 percent.” Vox, 28 Sep. 2014, https://www.vox.com/2014/9/28/6857567/hong-kong-used-to-be-18-percent-of-chinas-gdp-now-its-3-percent.
Leung, Christy. “Extradition bill not made to measure for mainland China and won’t be abandoned, Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam says” South China Morning Post, 1 Apr. 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3004067/extradition-bill-not-made-measure-mainland-china-and-wont.
Ip, Regina. “Hong Kong Is China, Like It or Not.” The New York Times, 1 Oct. 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/opinion/hong-kong-china-security-law.html. Yiu, Pak and Katakam Anand. “In one year, Hong Kong arrests 117 people under new security law” Reuters, 29 Jun. 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/one-year-hong-kong-arrests-117-people-under-new-security-law-2021-06-30/.
